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Abstract
This article argues that arbitration offers a valuable and efficient alternative to the judicial
resolution of disputes in a variety of areas, particularly in maritime law.
MARITIME ARBITRATION AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS
Wilfred Feinberg *
The courts of the Second Circuit, especially the Court of Ap-
peals and the District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York, have historically played a leading role in the develop-
ment of American maritime law.' That is still the case today,
although it may be true that novel and important problems now go
more frequently to the courts of other circuits, especially with the
growing business of the ports of the Gulf Coast and the West Coast
states.
My own interest in problems of maritime law, and more spe-
cifically in the relations between maritime arbitrators and federal
judges, rests partly on a sense of this historic tie, but I also have a
more personal interest. I have long believed that arbitration offers a
valuable and efficient alternative to the judicial resolution of dis-
putes in a variety of areas, including commercial relations gener-
ally, 2 and maritime commercial relations more specifically. Arbi-
tration is a profession-indeed, in some respects an art-that grows
each year in stature, in achievement and in demand. I believe this is
as it should be. The advantages offered by arbitration become more
compelling each year. As more and more cases clog the calendars of
the courts, arbitration obviously offers a comparatively speedy ap-
proach to resolving disputes-disputes that often involve very sub-
stantial amounts of money. Arbitration also offers degrees of flexi-
• Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This article is
based upon the text of remarks delivered on October 20, 1981, at the opening session of the
Fifth International Congress of Maritime Arbitrators, in New York City. The assistance of
David K. Thompson in the preparation of both the original remarks and this article is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. Indeed, the importance of the New York-based courts antedates the Revolution. See,
e.g., G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1939), pointing
out that the practice developed in the pre-Revolutionary New York admiralty court "has
widely passed on to all the courts of the United States."
2. See, e.g., Feinberg, Arbitration and Antitrust-An Introduction, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1069 (1969).
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bility and informality that cannot be matched in court proceedings.
Above all, arbitration offers the invaluable benefit of industrial
expertise and technical sophistication-qualities that are especially
important in a field so heavily shaped by tradition and immemorial
custom on the one hand, and the latest advances in the state of the
art on the other. Judges rarely possess, as a matter of general
background and experience, the same degree of familiarity with the
intricacies of maritime commercial relations that arbitrators com-
mand.
These are all benefits to the maritime industry, but they are
not the only benefits flowing from reliance on arbitration. The
fostering of a fully developed regime of maritime arbitration could
have an especially positive impact in an area of particular concern
to me-the heavy workloads of our country's federal courts.
Between July 1980 and June 1981, more than 180,000 civil
actions of all types were filed in federal district courts throughout
the nation, 3 an increase of seven percent over the previous year and
a 30.1 percent increase over the comparable 1977-1978 period. 4 Of
the total, more than 5,100 were cases involving maritime contracts,
an increase of eight percent -over the previous year, and more than
5,200 were cases involving marine torts.5 These actions alone thus
accounted for almost six percent of the total district court case-
load-and the figures do not take into account many other types of
maritime actions, including collision, salvage, general average and
marine insurance claims.
The statistics become much more dramatic if we look directly
at the relatively few districts that hear substantial numbers of
maritime cases. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York not only is the federal district court with the
highest number of civil filings in the nation, but also is a principal
forum for maritime disputes.6 In 1980-1981, some 8,000 civil cases
were commenced in that court.7 In the preceding statistical year,
of the civil cases filed, more than 1,400 were marine contract cases
3. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR
56 (1981).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 62.
6. See id. at A-14 to A-15.
7. Id. at A-14.
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and some 665 were marine personal injury cases. That is, maritime
cases accounted for more than 27 percent of the filings. 8
I should explain that this figure is a bit misleading: it does not
represent the actual workload of the courts in terms of trials and
formal decisions. This is so because the great bulk of the filings are
cargo damage claims that are settled out of court at some point
after a complaint is filed. But this fact in itself is informative,
suggesting as it does that a great many cases that are formally
submitted to the courts do not raise issues that only courts can
resolve.
I have no doubt that a well developed habit of arbitration
could go far toward reducing the heavy burden of maritime cases in
the Southern District and in similar courts. I do not suggest, of
course, that arbitration can replace adjudication in every instance.
There are certainly maritime matters that raise questions of law
and policy that properly belong in the courts, and that judges must
sooner or later resolve. But still, many of these cases can be resolved
more quickly, less expensively and just as responsibly, through the
machinery of maritime arbitration. The strengthening of this ma-
chinery is thus in a very real sense a contribution to the efficiency of
the federal courts as well as a benefit to the maritime industry.
I say this as one who believes strongly in the value of arbitra-
tion. But it must be recognized that not all judges have viewed the
work of maritime arbitrators with quite the same favor. Indeed,
courts have not always been eager-or even willing-to share re-
sponsibility for dispute resolution with arbitrators in any field.
Even though the Supreme Court gave a strong nod of approval to
labor arbitration more than 20 years ago in the landmark cases
known as the Steelworkers Trilogy,9 courts have not uniformly
given the same "hospitable acceptance"10 to arbitrators' awards.
8. M. Cohen, A Proposal for Mass Processing of Marine Cargo Claims in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 18 n. 1 (April 15, 1981) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Office of the Circuit Executive for the Second Circuit).
See also Committee on Federal Courts, A Proposal for a Pilot Program Concerning Cargo
Damage Cases, 37 Rc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 103, 114 n.1 (1982).
9. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
10. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), enforced sub nom.
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964) (referring to
the need for the National Labor Relations Board to give "hospitable acceptance" to the
arbitral process as part of the collective bargaining process).
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248 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:245
I think it is important to understand why courts may not
always give arbitration awards the recognition that they perhaps
deserve. Several factors underlie this common judicial skepticism.
First, it is no doubt true that some judges simply lack faith in the
competence and objectivity of arbitrators, or believe that they lack
the independence necessary for the full and fair resolution of even
the most straightforward disputes. Arbitrators are, after all, depen-
dent on the good will of their employers for their livelihood, even if
the work is only part-time, and so there may be a nagging pressure
to avoid making either party more unhappy than necessary, to look
for the easy solution rather than the correct one. Judges who doubt
the ability of arbitrators to resist such pressure are likely to bring to
their review of an award a certain presumption of error, or at least
taint, that may cloud their own ability to view the award dispas-
sionately.
Once diagnosed, this form of judicial discomfort with arbitra-
tion can, fortunately, be treated. Professional organizations of arbi-
trators, such as the American Arbitration Association and the Soci-
ety of Maritime Arbitrators, can do much to relieve judicial doubts
by promoting the highest standards of responsibility, competence,
integrity and independence. International cooperation and consul-
tation can also prove invaluable in the development of universal
norms of practice, which are of acute importance in the maritime
area. This is, of course, a long process, and one that can never
really be completed, but already great progress has been made.
There are, however, more deeply rooted sources of judicial
resistance to arbitration, and these may be more difficult to over-
come because they are harder to pin down. To speak frankly, I
believe one basic factor is simply a sense of turf, a kind of territorial
instinct on the part of many, if not all, judges. Judges simply find it
difficult to accept the notion that someone other than a judge
should resolve the kind of disputes that judges deal with every day.
Judges are reluctant to turn over responsibility and power to decide
such cases to a non-judge, or, heaven forbid, to a non-lawyer.
This reluctance is naturally heightened when a judge is pressed
for relief from an arbitration award that is alleged to be wrong,
unfair or unjust. Judges are trained to correct mistakes that give rise
to unjust results; it is a very basic part of their job to do so. They
are, after all, solemnly charged under the United States Constitu-
tion and the laws to seek justice and the proper application of the
law in each case. It is often difficult for a judge to remember that in
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giving effect to an arbitration award, he or she is still carrying out
the commands of the judicial office, serving a recognized national
policy of support for arbitration.
I do not mean to suggest that a cautious attitude on the part of
judges is wrong. On the contrary, judicial review may properly
result in the rejection of some awards-where, for example, arbi-
trators have exceeded their powers under the arbitration agree-
ment, or where they have acted in manifest disregard of the law,"
as distinguished from a simple misconstruction of a contract provi-
sion. 2 But judges must be careful to review arbitration awards in
accordance with these established standards of review, freeing
themselves of any unconscious bias against the arbitration process as
a whole.
Of course, that may be good advice for judges, but it does not
really suggest what arbitrators, individually and as a group, can do
to lessen this almost subconscious judicial resistance to arbitration
awards. In an ideal world, arbitrators could, of course, decide
every dispute with such Solomonic wisdom that no party would
dare ask a court to set it aside. But even short of this state of
perfection, I suggest that judicial nervousness may be eased over
time by a consistent pattern of care and competence in arbitration
decisions. I recognize that it is not necessary under our law that an
arbitration award be supported by an explanation of the arbitra-
tor's reasoning. Indeed, not too many years ago, our court explicitly
so held in Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.13 Nevertheless, it is my
belief that an award resting on a carefully written justification will
fare better in court in most instances. In this connection, I think the
practice of publishing written awards, employed, for example, by
the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, is beneficial. Such publication
is likely to prove helpful to arbitrators themselves and to courts that
are called upon to review their awards.
There is, I realize, a certain risk in publishing an opinion, the
risk that a judge may start dissecting an award line by line. But in
this circuit, at least, such dissection is not favored. Our governing
principle for the review of arbitration awards was stated clearly in
11. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
12. See I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir.
1974).
13. 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598.
1982]
250 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:245
Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 14 in which we
said: "When arbitrators explain their conclusions ... in terms that
offer even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached,
confirmation of the award cannot be prevented by litigants who
merely argue, however persuasively, for a different result."'-,
Thus, so long as there are no procedural irregularities or miscon-
duct sufficient to taint the arbitration process, an award that offers
a "barely colorable justification" for its outcome should withstand
judicial review in the Second Circuit.' 6
Of course, judges are not the only ones who must exercise
restraint in order to protect the finality of arbitration awards. It is
even more important that the parties who chose arbitration in the
first place learn to live with the results, whether they like them or
not. They accepted the risk of an unhappy result when they agreed
to arbitrate as part of their overall bargain, and they must under-
stand that the terms of the bargain do not change simply because
they lost their case. There are, to be sure, some exceptions; they are
spelled out in the Federal Arbitration Act,' 7 in state law,' 8 and in
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.' 9 But these exceptions must be strictly con-
strued.20  Mere unhappiness with the result of an arbitration pro-
ceeding cannot be a sound basis for running to court. Surprisingly,
in some cases the trip to court comes even earlier, as an effort to
prevent the arbitration from taking place. I have often wondered in
such cases why the parties signed an agreement containing an
arbitration clause, if they have so little faith in the process. 2'
Obviously, the decision to go to court is not one made by
arbitrators; the burden of this decision falls most heavily on the
14. 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978).
15. Id. at 704.
16. Id. See also Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948,
960 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1980).
19. Opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, enforced in United States courts pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
20. Cf. Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 703 (2d Cir.
1978) ("We have consistently accorded the narrowest of readings to the Arbitration Act's
authorization to vacate awards '[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers .... . ").
21. Cf. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co.,
407 F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (labyrinthine arbitration
clause rendered questionable any advantages to parties of agreeing to arbitration).
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lawyer whose client has lost an award. The client in these circum-
stances may well feel wronged, and be eager to pursue the issue
further, whether to delay or avoid altogether the payment of a
monetary award or to vindicate a perceived principle. The easiest
course for counsel may be to acquiesce quietly in the client's desire
to continue the fight, on the theory that there is relatively little to
lose. But lawyers, like judges and arbitrators, must exercise care
and restraint if this system is to survive. Lawyers, too, bear a
responsibility for the development of arbitration as an effective
alternative, not a supplement, to litigation. If litigation becomes
the predictable by-product of the arbitral process, the value of
arbitration will inevitably disappear.
All of the above makes clear, I think, that the future of arbitra-
tion in this country, and the peaceful coexistence of arbitrators and
judges, demand a measure of discipline and understanding on all
sides. In the long run, judicial restraint in reviewing arbitration
awards will prove impossible if the results reached in arbitration
proceedings reveal a pattern of caprice, sloppiness or disregard of
facts, contract provisions and law. On the other hand, the potential
of arbitration as an alternative to the courts will never be realized if
judges do not take a firm enough stand in support of the arbitral
process and the finality of arbitration awards.
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